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Callies and Robyak: The Categorical (Lucas) Rule

THE CATEGORICAL (LUCAS) RULE: “BACKGROUND
PRINCIPLES,” PER SE REGULATORY TAKINGS, AND THE
STATE OF EXCEPTIONS
David L. Callies
David A. Robyak
I.

INTRODUCTION: THE CATEGORICAL OR PER SE TOTAL
REGULATORY TAKE—LUCAS V. SOUTH CAROLINA COASTAL
COUNCIL

A land use regulation totally takes property by regulation
when it leaves the landowner without “economically beneficial use”
of land. The land may have value. Indeed, it may even have some
limited “salvage” uses, such as for walking or picnicking. But if it
has no economically beneficial use, then the government must pay
for the land as if it had condemned it, or lift the offending regulation
and potentially pay for the time during which the unconstitutional
regulation affected the use of the relevant land. These are the rules of
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,1 and First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles.2
In Lucas, a state coastal zone protection statute prevented David Lucas from constructing two beachfront houses on two separate
lots.3 The statute prevented development forward of a beach line in
order to protect coastal habitat, plant, animal and marine species, the
natural environment, and tourism.4 Remaining legal uses included
walking, limited camping, and picnicking. The United States Su

FAICP, Benjamin A. Kudo Professor of Law, William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawai`i. AB, DePauw University; JD, University of Michigan; LLM, University
of Nottingham (planning law); Life Member, Clare Hall, Cambridge University.

Third-year law student, William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawai`i.
BA, Washington & Lee University; MA, University of Hawai`i.
1
505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
2
482 U.S. 304 (1987).
3
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1006-07.
4
Id. at 1007; S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-250 (1990).
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preme Court reversed the Supreme Court of South Carolina, holding
that a regulation that removes all productive or economically beneficial use from a parcel of land is a regulatory taking requiring compensation under the Fifth Amendment.5 The Court emphasized use,
not value, in holding that the remaining permitted uses were not economically beneficial.6 The court imposed no limitations on this per
se, categorical rule except for two exceptions briefly noted below.
Observing that too often land use regulations having as their principal
purpose the preservation of the environment have forced a single
landowner to bear the burden of such public benefits, the Court said:
Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that
deprives land of all economically beneficial use, we
think it may resist compensation only if the logically
antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner’s estate
shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of
his title to begin with.7
II.

LUCAS APPLIED

Closely following this reasoning in Lucas, a Maryland court
held that an open space zoning category effectively foreclosed all
economically viable use when applied to private property, resulting in
a total taking:
While a strong argument can be made that the
statutory scheme here at issue . . . is for the common
good, that argument, if resolved favorably to the
County, does not, under Lucas, resolve the matter.
Even if it were for the common good, it still may
cause an unconstitutional taking if it, as it does in the
case sub judice, results in the loss of all viable economic uses.8
On the other hand, a Florida appeals court held that a recreational use was sufficiently economically beneficial to take a case out
of the per se takings category of regulatory takings because that was
one of the uses being made of the subject parcel and there was some
5
6
7
8

Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030, 1032.
Id. at 1027.
Id.
Steel v. Cape Corp., 677 A.2d 634, 645 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996).
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evidence that this was one of the reasons the landowner had acquired
the parcel.9 Similarly, an Ohio appeals court held that the denial of a
conditional use permit for mineral extraction was not a total regulatory taking because the owner was not denied all economically viable
use; the property was zoned for many other uses and could be sold to
a developer who could use the property in a manner consistent with
zoning laws.10
Whether and how to apply the Lucas rule has remained an issue in more recent state and federal court opinions. Some plaintiffs
have applied Lucas to leasehold interests,11 personal property,12 and
water rights,13 while others have presented facts requiring courts to
distinguish carefully Lucas claims from other types of takings,14 to
explain what constitutes deprivation of “all economically beneficial
9

Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Burgess, 772 So. 2d 540, 542-43 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.

2000).
10
State ex rel. Shelly Materials, Inc. v. Clark Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, No. 2003-CA-72,
2005 WL 3454751, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2005).
11
See Love Terminal Partners v. United States, 97 Fed. Cl. 355, 391, 424-25 (2011)
(holding that plaintiff, lessee of airport terminal space to be demolished under contract incorporated into federal law, had stated valid claims for “categorical” regulatory and physical
takings, and granting plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on the physical takings claim); McGuire v. United States, 97 Fed. Cl. 425, 428 (2011) (alleging Lucas taking
when Bureau of Indian Affairs demolished bridge providing access to portion of property
plaintiff, a farmer, leased from the Colorado River Indian Tribes).
12
See Kafka v. Mont. Dep’t of Fish, Wildlife & Parks, 201 P.3d 8, 32 (Mont. 2009)
(stating that alternative livestock raised as game were not subject to any variety of regulatory
taking when voter initiative made it illegal to charge a fee to shoot them because plaintiffs
could make other economically viable use of the animals); Buhmann v. State, 201 P.3d 70,
90 (Mont. 2009) (avoiding decision on whether alternative livestock raised as game could be
categorically taken by finding that animals retained obvious value); Wawrzynski v. City of
San Diego, D059336, 2012 WL 1201902, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2012) (holding that
claim of regulatory taking of pedicabs could proceed because putative dictum in Lucas excluded only personal property for sale or used to manufacture for sale).
13
Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (2001)
(granting plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment for physical, not regulatory taking); Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 59 Fed. Cl. 246 (2003) (determining
damages); Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 61 Fed. Cl. 624 (2004)
(amending damages on reconsideration); Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 102 Fed.
Cl. 443 (2011), aff’d, 708 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (holding that plaintiff had alleged a
physical, not a regulatory taking and that same was unripe). At least one commentator has
argued vigorously for water rights to be treated under regulatory, not physical takings standards such that the public trust doctrine would apply as a defense. John D. Echeverria, The
Public Trust Doctrine as a Background Principles Defense in Takings Litigation, 45 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 931, 933 (2012).
14
Dos Picos Land Ltd. P’ship v. Pima Cnty., 240 P.3d 853 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010); Love
Terminal Partners, 97 Fed. Cl. 355; Brenner v. New Richmond Reg’l Airport Comm’n, 816
N.W.2d 291 (Wis. 2012).
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use” in various contexts,15 and to define a sub-category of regulatory
takings covering “temporary but categorical” takings.16
A.

The Categorical Rule Distinguished from Physical
and Partial Takings

Some courts go to considerable lengths to explain why an alleged per se categorical taking did or did not constitute a valid claim
under Lucas. In the process, a few appeared slightly confused in distinguishing Lucas from the takings tests set out in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.17 and Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. City of New York.18 Recall that in Loretto the court affirmed
the traditional rule that “regulations that compel the property owner
to suffer a physical ‘invasion’ of his property” are a taking “no matter
how minute the intrusion,”19 while in Penn Central the court established a multi-factor balancing test for partial regulatory takings that
considers the character of the government regulation or action in light
of “[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant[,]” especially “the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations.”20 More than one court concluded
that multiple takings theories applied to the same facts.
In Dos Picos Land Ltd. Partnership v. Pima County,21 an Arizona appellate court vacated an award of litigation expenses and interest on a successful inverse condemnation claim because the trial
court erroneously held that the taking was physical not regulatory.
The court said the state statute allowing such fees applied only in
physical takings cases.22 After devoting significant space to distinguishing regulatory from physical takings, the court suggested that
the facts could justify either a categorical taking under Lucas or a
partial regulatory taking under Penn Central, although Penn Central

15

Collins v. Monroe Cnty., 999 So. 2d 709, 711 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008); Shands v.
City of Marathon, 999 So. 2d 718, 723 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008); Cummins v. Robinson
Twp., 770 N.W.2d 421 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009); McGuire, 97 Fed. Cl. 425; Walton v. City of
Midland, 409, S.W.3d 926 (2013).
16
Res. Inv., Inc. v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 447 (2009).
17
458 U.S. 419 (1982) (regarding physical occupation).
18
438 U.S. 104 (1978) (regarding partial regulatory taking).
19
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015; Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441.
20
Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
21
240 P.3d 853 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010).
22
Dos Picos Land Ltd. P’ship, 240 P.3d at 855.
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was referenced only obliquely via Lingle v. Chevron.23 In the end,
the court declared that a regulatory taking of some variety had occurred, but declined to specify further.24
In Love Terminal Partners v. United States,25 the U.S. Court
of Claims denied the government’s motion to dismiss takings claims
and granted partial summary judgment for the plaintiff, a lessee of
terminal space in a municipal airport that, under a contract incorporated into a federal statute, was to be demolished and rendered unusable for commercial aviation purposes, the only permitted use in the
lease.26 After reviewing takings jurisprudence in depth, the court
held that the plaintiff had stated a valid claim for a physical taking
under Loretto as well as a per se regulatory taking.27 The court
granted plaintiff’s motion on the physical taking claim, but appeared
nonetheless favorable toward plaintiff’s prospects under Lucas.28 In
the context of personal property, an appellate court in California was
similarly persuaded in Wawrzynski v. City of San Diego29 that the
plaintiff had sufficiently alleged taking claims under multiple theories: in this case, Lucas and Penn Central.30 With little explanation,
however, the court ultimately suggested that Penn Central was the
more appropriate test.31
Choosing a proper taking standard was the central issue in
Brenner v. New Richmond Regional Airport.32 In Brenner, several
plaintiffs living near a newly expanded airport filed an inverse condemnation action alleging that the longer runway and resulting overflights had effectively taken an easement through their airspace.33
Following a bench trial, the trial court erroneously adopted a regulatory takings standard and dismissed the action because the plaintiffs
had not demonstrated deprivation of all or part of the beneficial use
of their properties.34 An appellate court reversed, and the Wisconsin
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

Id. at 857-58; 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
Dos Picos Land Ltd. P’ship, 240 P.3d at 859.
97 Fed. Cl. 355 (2011).
Id. at 424-25.
Id.
Id.
D059336, 2012 WL 1201902 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2012).
Id. at *2.
Id. at *6.
816 N.W.2d 291 (Wis. 2012).
Id. at 294.
Id. at 298.
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Supreme Court affirmed, citing United States v. Causby35 and holding
that the case involved a physical not a regulatory taking:
The standard for a taking in an airplane overflight case
is whether the overflights have been low enough—that
is, invasions of a person’s block of superadjacent airspace—and frequent enough to have a direct and immediate effect on the use and enjoyment of the person’s property. If this standard can be satisfied, the
government has “taken” an easement without paying
compensation for it. Because the circuit court applied
the much more stringent standard of a regulatory taking, the circuit court erred.36
The case was remanded for application of the correct test.37
B.

“All Economically Beneficial Use”

In addition to resolving when to apply the per se total takings
rule, courts have attempted to clarify exactly what constitutes deprivation of “all economically beneficial or productive use of land”38
under Lucas. Recall that Justice Scalia’s majority opinion repeatedly
stressed land use, not land value, as the measure of a categorical taking, expressly equating the “sacrifice [of] all economically beneficial
uses” to “leav[ing the] property economically idle.”39 That the land
retains some market value or that non-economic “salvage” uses still
exist is extraneous to the analysis.40
In Collins v. Monroe County,41 a Florida appellate court reversed a trial court decision that found multiple “facial” takings under
Lucas when property owners subject to the county’s new Compre35

328 U.S. 256 (1946).
Brenner, 816 N.W.2d at 304.
37
Id.
38
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
39
Id. at 1019 (emphasis in original).
40
David L. Callies, Takings: An Introduction and Overview, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 441,
446 (2002); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 34 F. Supp.
2d 1226, 1243 (D. Nev. 1999), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 216 F.3d 764 (2000), aff’d, 535
U.S. 302 (2002) (stating that “the fact that someone, such as the government or an environmental group, may be willing to pay for land that can only be ‘used’ in its natural state does
not necessarily mean that the ‘use’ of leaving the property in its natural state is an ‘economically viable’ one.”).
41
999 So. 2d 709 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
36
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hensive Plan successfully obtained Beneficial Use Determinations
(BUDs) from the Board of County Commissioner’s which declared
their properties unbuildable.42 After declaring the taking claim at issue to be an “as-applied” challenge under Penn Central, the court
held that, while the BUDs functioned as final determinations from the
County to satisfy ripeness requirements under Williamson County
Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank,43 it did not suffice
to determine whether the properties were actually deprived of all
economically beneficial use, which the court suggested was far from
apparent.44 Instead, the case was remanded for application of the
Penn Central test.45
Distinguishing “facial” from “as-applied” regulatory taking
claims was likewise an issue in Shands v. City of Marathon,46 where
the same Florida appellate court again reversed a trial court’s choice
of Lucas over Penn Central, which had had the effect of moving the
claim outside the statutory four-year limitations period.47 Beyond
holding that plaintiff’s claims were both ripe and within the statute of
limitations, the court noted that the transferrable development rights
available under the City’s Comprehensive Plan, as well as the opportunity to apply for a variance for a single-family home, defeated any
claim that designation of the plaintiff’s 7.9 acres in the Florida Keys
within a conservation zone had deprived the property of all economically beneficial use.48
In Cummins v. Robinson Township,49 an appellate court in
Michigan reversed the decision below because the trial court had incorrectly applied Lucas instead of Penn Central when the Township
required property owners to employ flood-resistant construction to
rebuild several homes destroyed by a flood in a flood zone.50 Plaintiffs argued that they suffered a categorical taking under Lucas because the Township required them “to either abandon their home or
rebuild it at costs far exceeding its value, which essentially deprived
42
Id. at 713 (explaining that Lucas applied to “facial” takings, whereas Penn Central
applied to “as applied” challenges).
43
473 U.S. 172 (1985).
44
Collins, 999 So. 2d at 715-16.
45
Id. at 718.
46
999 So. 2d 718 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
47
Id. at 720.
48
Id. at 724, 726.
49
770 N.W.2d 421 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009).
50
Id. at 439, 441-42.
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them of all its economically beneficial use.”51 The court disagreed,
holding that “ ‘[t]he Taking[s] Clause does not guarantee property
owners an economic profit from the use of their land.’ ”52
Using the same basic rationale, the Court of Federal Claims in
McGuire v. United States53 found the application of a total regulatory
taking test inappropriate and remanded for the case to proceed under
Penn Central after the Bureau of Indian Affairs demolished a bridge
linking two portions of property leased by a farmer from the Colorado River Indian Tribes.54 The plaintiff claimed inverse condemnation, alleging that the “removal of the bridge caused his lease to have
a ‘negative market value’ because ‘the southern portion was destined
to fail to generate enough crop and resulting income to make the
lease payment.’ ”55 Strictly applying the Lucas rule, the court asserted that “[a] total deprivation of ‘all economically beneficial or productive use[s]’ . . . must occur.”56 That the plaintiff might be upsidedown on his lease was insufficient.57
A Texas appellate court in Walton v. City of Midland58 affirmed the trial court’s rejection of a categorical per se taking when
the City granted a drilling permit to the lessee of the oil and gas rights
beneath the plaintiff’s property.59 In addition to holding that Midland
merely gave the lessee permission to do what the title allowed, the
court—arguably in conflict with Lucas’s emphasis on use over value—concluded that the plaintiff had not stated a viable claim because
his “evidence indicate[d] that his property had a value of at least
$3,000 per acre after [the lessee] drilled the well.”60 The court further stated “[a]ccordingly, the granting of the permit did not deprive
him of all economically beneficial use of the property to the extent
that he was only left with a token interest.”61

51

Id. at 442-43.
Id. at 443 (quoting Paragon Props. Co. v. City of Novi, 550 N.W.2d 772, 782 n.13
(Mich. 1996).
53
97 Fed. Cl. 425 (2011).
54
Id. at 429, 440-41.
55
Id. at 440.
56
Id. (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015).
57
Id.
58
409 S.W.3d 926 (Tex. App. 2013).
59
Id. at 928.
60
Id. at 932.
61
Id.
52
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Finally, in Resource Investments, Inc. v. United States,62 the
Court of Federal Claims confronted the issue of “whether applying
Lucas to plaintiffs’ temporary regulatory takings claim would violate
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency . . . and the ‘parcel as a whole’ rule.”63 The plaintiffs owned
and leased a large parcel that, due to its hydrogeology, was wellsuited to landfill use and little else, but the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (COE) denied a dredge and fill permit allegedly required because wetlands had been discovered on the property.64 Distinguishing Tahoe-Sierra, the court noted that the regulation here was not
expressly temporally limited but prospectively permanent; therefore,
there was no severance of the parcel into temporal slices.65 Moreover, unlike in First English, the resolution of the temporary taking in
this case was the result of a Ninth Circuit decision that found the
COE exercised improper jurisdiction over the site, not because the
government had withdrawn the regulations.66 As the court put it:
[T]hat plaintiffs eventually regained economically viable use of their property is not ipso facto fatal to their
categorical takings claim. But in order to determine
whether the denial effected a categorical taking as a
matter of law, this court must now inquire whether
plaintiffs lacked any economically viable use of their
property after the Corps denied plaintiffs’ permit.67
Ultimately, the court denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment
on their Lucas claim, but only for lack of proof of causation, which
the court suggested could be demonstrated in further proceedings.68
III.

THE EXCEPTIONS

The U.S. Supreme Court set out two exceptions to its categorical rule—situations in which the proscribed use interests would not
62

85 Fed. Cl. 447 (2009).
Id. at 469 (citing Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 303). In Tahoe-Sierra, the Court held
that temporary regulations that deprive property of all economically viable use are to be analyzed under Penn Central, not Lucas, because the deprivation is only to a temporal segment
of the parcel. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 331.
64
Res. Invs. Inc., 85 Fed. Cl. at 455, 461.
65
Id. at 481.
66
Id. at 461.
67
Id. at 485.
68
Id. at 493, 523.
63
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be a part of the owner’s title to begin with: nuisance and background
principles of a state’s law of property.69 The exceptions provide the
only safe haven for state and local government when a land use regulation takes all economically beneficial use from a parcel of land.
Although recent appellate opinions have addressed relatively few takings cases that have turned primarily on nuisance abatement as a defense, background principles—chiefly, variations of the public trust
doctrine and, to a lesser extent, customary law—have seen increasing
action and, in some jurisdictions, considerable extension.70 Ironically, whereas Lucas has generally been viewed as a victory for property
rights, the courts have tended to construe the denial-of-economicallybeneficial-use test very narrowly, while deployment of “the background principles defense has proved to be a fertile ground for government defendants.”71
A.

The Nuisance Exception

If the law of the jurisdiction would allow neighbors or the
state to prohibit the proposed uses of land because they would constitute either public or private nuisances, then government could prohibit them without providing compensation.72 This is because such nuisances are always unlawful and are never part of a landowner’s title
to begin with, so prohibiting them would not deprive a landowner of
a property right.73 The Court gave as examples laws that would prevent the construction of a nuclear power plant on an earthquake fault
line, or the filling of lakefront land so as to raise the water level and

69

See David L. Callies, Nuisance and Background Principles: The Lucas Exceptions,
SJ052 ALI-ABA 473 (2004) (providing an earlier look at the two exceptions).
70
The growing importance and application of the public trust doctrine is reflected by
the recent publication of the first casebook dedicated to it. MICHAEL C. BLUMM & MARY C.
WOOD, THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE LAW
(2013). Because of the public trust doctrine’s “remarkable” evolution and recent development as a “burgeoning area of the law,” Professor Blumm notes that it “remains . . . largely
mysterious.” Michael C. Blumm, The Public Trust Doctrine—A Twenty-First Century Concept, 16 HASTINGS W.-NW.J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 105, 107, 109 (2010). For a thorough investigation of the nuisance exception, see Professor Carol Necole Brown’s excellent and
thought-provoking analysis in this symposium at 30 TOURO L. REV. 349 (2014).
71
Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321, 341
(2005).
72
Id. at 335.
73
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030.
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flood neighboring land.74
While most nuisance exceptions have generally been applied
to mining cases,75 at least one (sharply divided) court has upheld the
denial of a permit to construct a marina even if the owner were left
with no economically beneficial use, on the ground that the additional
traffic generated would constitute a nuisance and therefore constitute
an exception to the categorical rule.76 An Arizona appellate court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the City of Phoenix when the
City closed a “swingers’ club” featuring live sex acts because the
“business clearly fell within the type of conduct that could have been
abated at common law as a public health hazard[,]” although it corrected the trial court’s erroneous use of Penn Central instead of Lucas as the relevant takings test.77 The Florida Supreme Court has also
extended “nuisance exception” status to the closing of a motel used
for prostitution and drug dealing, though not to an apartment used occasionally for drug transactions, which the City of Miami also closed,
in Keshbro, Inc. v. City of Miami.78 To the same effect, State v. Rezcallah,79 held the padlocking of property for one year, as a result of
drug activity, not to be a nuisance exception and not substantially advancing a legitimate state interest in curtailing the use and sales of
drugs.80
On remand from the United States Supreme Court81 and the
Supreme Court of Rhode Island,82 the trial court in Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island83 undertook the Penn Central analysis it had originally

74

Id. at 1029.
See, e.g., Rith Energy, Inc. v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 366, 367 (1999); Kinross
Copper Corp. v. State, 981 P.2d 833, 840 (Or. Ct. App. 2001); Machipongo Land & Coal
Co. v. Commonwealth, 799 A.2d 751, 774-75 (Pa. 2002) (holding that the danger to public
waterways from mining pollution constituted a public nuisance); but see Placer Mining Co.
v. United States, 98 Fed. Cl. 681, 685 (2011) (discussing the rule that “a landowner has no
right to maintain a nuisance on his property—is based on a rule derived from regulatory takings cases, particularly Lucas” while “the rule’s applicability to physical takings is far from
settled.”).
76
Windward Marina, L.L.C. v. City of Destin, 743 So. 2d 635, 640 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1999).
77
Mutschler v. City of Phoenix, 129 P.3d 71, 77 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006).
78
801 So. 2d 864, 877 (Fla. 2001).
79
702 N.E.2d 81 (Ohio 1998).
80
Id. at 85.
81
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
82
Palazzolo v. State ex rel. Tavares, 785 A.2d 561 (R.I. 2001).
83
Palazzolo v. State ex rel. Tavares, 746 A.2d 707 (R.I. 2000).
75
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neglected in favor of Lucas.84 Palazzolo owned eighteen acres of
wetland adjacent to a tidal salt-water pond and brought an inverse
condemnation action when the state refused permits to fill the land
and construct a beach club.85 The second trial judge, agreeing with
the first, held that Palazzolo had failed to prove a partial regulatory
taking and, even if he had, “Plaintiff’s proposed residential development of the site would constitute a public nuisance under Rhode Island law. Plaintiff’s proposed use of the property was, accordingly,
not a part of the ‘bundle of rights’ acquired when he . . . obtained title
to the subject parcel.”86 Moreover, said the court, roughly one-half of
the land was undevelopable because it was subject to the public trust
doctrine.87
In Monks v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes,88 an appellate court
in California rejected the City’s argument that regulatory takings
claims were nullified by the nuisance exception to Lucas where a
moratorium prevented construction on land subject to landslides.
Declaring that the City had failed to meet its burden to show that
construction on the land posed “a reasonable probability of personal
injury or property damage other than the possibility of damage to
plaintiffs’ desired homes in the distant future,”89 the court held that
the moratorium ordinance had taken all economically beneficial use
from the effected lots.90 In a subsequent appeal of the same case,
however, the court rejected the plaintiff’s claim for compensation for
decline in the market value of the property when the City relented
and allowed residential development of the lots.91 “The City did not
have to pay compensation to plaintiffs for the permanent taking because it provided a constitutionally acceptable alternative remedy.”92
The nuisance abatement defense to inverse condemnation
failed again in Department of Agriculture & Consumer Services v.

84

Palazzo v. State, No. WM 88-0297, 2005 WL 1645974, at *5 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 5,

2005).
85

Id. at *1.
Id. at *14.
87
Id.
88
84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 75 (Ct. App. 2008).
89
Id. at 80.
90
Id. at 110.
91
Monks v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes, B237221, 2013 WL 1248251, at *16 (Cal.
Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2013)
92
Id. at *1.
86
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Bogorff.93 In Bogorff, a class-action involving roughly 50,000 plaintiffs, a Florida appellate court affirmed the trial court’s holding that
the Department had taken over 100,000 healthy citrus trees when it
destroyed them as part of a citrus canker eradication program. The
state agency claimed that the trees, likely already exposed to the disease, would have eventually fallen victim to the canker, and thus
were valueless. The only way to stop the canker, argued the Department, was to destroy the trees. The court found those contentions
both pretextual and illogical:
It is apparent . . . that [the Department] destroyed
these privately owned healthy trees not because they
were really “imminently dangerous” to anybody but
instead to benefit the citrus industry in Florida. . . . To
be a public nuisance, property must cause “inconvenience or damage to the public generally.” If trees are
destroyed not to prevent harm but instead to benefit an
industry, it is difficult to understand how [the Department] can argue on appeal that the trees legally constituted a nuisance without any value. Property with any
value cannot be deemed a nuisance, the nature of
which perforce lacks that redeeming quality.94
In response to the Department’s claim that the trial court had employed the wrong standard for regulatory takings, the court declined
to specify the proper standard: “The facts of this case require no application of multi-part, recondite tests to decide whether the state
regulation has gone too far and must pay just compensation. Cutting
down and destroying healthy non-commercial trees of private citizens
could hardly be more definitively a taking.”95
B.

The Background Principles Exception

As with nuisance, if a regulation is consistent with a background principle of a state’s law of property, again there would be no
deprivation of a cognizable right in property.96 While the Court in
Lucas gave no examples of such a background principle, customary
93
94
95
96

35 So. 3d 84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
Id. at 89.
Id. at 90.
Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 71, at 325 (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029).
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rights and land held subject to public trust are emerging as such
background principles in several jurisdictions.97
1.

The Public Trust Doctrine as a Background
Principle

Broadly stated, the public trust doctrine provides that a state
holds public trust lands, waters and living resources in trust for the
benefit of its citizens, establishing the right of the public to fully enjoy them for a variety of public uses and purposes.98 Implied in this
definition are limitations on the private use of such waters and land,
which are impressed with the public trust, as well as limitations on
how the state may transfer interests in such land and water, particularly if such transfer will prevent public use.99 Such definitions and
duties analytically flow from the dual nature of title in public trust
lands and water.100 On the one hand, the public has the right to use
and enjoy the land and water—the res of the public trust—for such
activities as commerce, navigation, fishing, bathing, and related public purposes.101 This is the so-called jus publicum.102 On the other
hand, since fully one-third of public trust property is reportedly in
private hands rather than public,103 private property rights coexist
with public rights in much land and water subject to the public trust
doctrine. This is the so-called jus privatum.104
The issue, of course, is the extent to which the public trust
doctrine can legally eliminate private property rights without com97

David L. Callies & J. David Breemer, Selected Legal and Policy Trends in Takings
Law: Background Principles, Custom and Public Trust “Exceptions” and the (Mis)Use of
Investment-Backed Expectations, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 339, 361 (2002).
98
DAVID SLADE, PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO WORK 5 (Coastal States
Organization, 2d ed., 1990); see generally, George P. Smith & Michael W. Sweeney, The
Public Trust Doctrine and Natural Law: Emanations Within A Penumbra, 33 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 307 (2006); see also Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern
Public Trust Doctrines: Classifications of States, Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16
PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2007) (detailing the states’ many manifestations of the public
trust doctrine); Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States’ Public
Trust Doctrines: Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Ecological
Public Trust, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53 (2010).
99
Slade, supra note 98, at 5-6.
100
Id. at 6.
101
Id.
102
Smith & Sweeney, supra note 98, at 311.
103
Id.
104
Id.
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pensation required by the United States Constitution’s’ Fifth
Amendment. To the extent that such rights are recognized, they
would constitute a diminution of the fee simple much like the recognized private limitations on fee simple such as leaseholds, easements,
and the burdens of covenants running with the land.105 These are interests held by strangers to the basic title of the landowner, and are
therefore “not part of his title to begin with.”106 In the same fashion,
if public trust rights are valid, then these also represent interests in
private land which are “not part of [the owner’s] title to begin
with”—a valid, background principle of property law which provides
an exception to the per se categorical regulatory takings rule of the
Lucas case.107
The issue of regulatory taking in connection with public trust
arises most frequently when a state court or legislature “reaffirms”
the public’s trust “rights” on private property.108 This occurs when a
state: (1) imposes restrictions on privately-held trust lands; (2) requires public access across private land or access to trust lands or water; or (3) expands the scope of public activities permitted under the
guise of public trust rights.109 Most public trust lands are submerged,
tidal, or water-flowed.110 However, some courts expand the application of public trust doctrine to “dry-sand” and other more useable and
developable areas.111
Many courts find the public trust doctrine applies at least to
submerged and tide-flowed lands. Thus, in the landmark case of Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois,112 the United States Supreme
Court held that the Illinois legislature could not transfer in fee simple
land under Lake Michigan because that land was held in public trust
for the people of the state.113 However, the state could sell small parcels of public trust land, the use of which would promote the public

105

See, e.g., Slade, supra note 98.
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 1028-29.
109
Callies & Breemer, supra note 97, at 372-73.
110
Bertram C. Frey & Andrew Mutz, The Public Trust in Surface Waterways and
Submerged Lands of the Great Lakes States, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 907, 923 (2007).
111
E.g., Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines, supra note
98, at 18 (noting that New Jersey has recognized “public trust rights to use the dry sand
(above the high tide line) portions of both public and private beaches.”).
112
146 U.S. 387 (1892).
113
Id. at 444-45.
106
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interest (docks, piers, wharves) so long as this did not impair the public interest in the lake and the remaining submerged land.114 In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi,115 the Court extended the public
trust to all lands under “waters [influenced by] the ebb and flow of
the tides.”116
Courts have also rejected takings claims brought by landowners whose plans for development are thwarted by the application of
the public trust doctrine. In Orion Corp. v. State,117 the court held
that a landowner could have no investment-backed expectations in its
land development plans, frustrated after purchase by a series of
coastal and tideland protective statutes, because all of Washington’s
shoreline was impressed with a public trust which, of course, could
not be alienated.118 However, the court noted that the statutes and
regulations were more restrictive than would result from a reasonable
application of the public trust doctrine alone, and that to the extent
they left the landowner without any economically viable use of the
land, a regulatory taking would occur.119 A federal court in Madison
v. Graham120 upheld what it considered to be a “narrow” use by the
public of streams and streambeds for recreational uses against a claim
of takings by a landowner brought on a “right to exclude” theory.121
Also, the court in National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County,122 rejected a private takings claim on public trust
grounds.123
Perhaps the biggest extension of the public trust doctrine is
represented by Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n,124 extending the public trust doctrine to private dry sand beach areas for both
access to and limited use of the ocean and foreshore.125 The court
held that the public rights to the water would be meaningless unless
the public were guaranteed both access and a place to rest intermit114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125

Id. at 452-54.
484 U.S. 469 (1988).
Id. at 476.
747 P.2d 1062 (Wash. 1987).
Id. at 1086.
Id. at 1078.
126 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (D. Mont. 2001), aff’d 316 F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 2002).
Madison, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 1324.
658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
Id. at 732.
471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984).
Id. at 369-70.
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tently.126 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin even extended the public
trust doctrine to a wetland (which became a bird sanctuary) created
by the property owner in the course of development in R. W. Docks &
Slips v. Wisconsin.127
Building upon the growing body of law finding that private
land impressed with a public trust may be regulated with impunity
specifically as a “background principles” exception is McQueen v.
South Carolina Coastal Council.128 McQueen purchased two noncontiguous lots adjacent to man-made canals in the early 1960’s, but
left them unimproved until the early 1990’s, by which time neighboring lots were improved with bulkheads and retaining walls, while
McQueen’s had “reverted” to tidelands.129 When McQueen applied
to the appropriate state authority for permission to backfill his lots
and build his own bulkhead, the state denied the requisite permit on
the ground that it would destroy the “critical environment” on those
lots. Both a special master and the court of appeals130 agreed that the
denial left the lots without any economically beneficial use and so resulted in a total taking under Lucas. Initially, the state supreme court
denied relief because it found “confusion” over whether the “investment-backed expectations” standard—a “partial takings” standard as
appears below—applied to total takings.131 After the U.S. Supreme
Court vacated and remanded132 for further consideration in light of
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,133 the state supreme court denied compensation on the ground that “[South Carolina] holds presumptive title to
land below the high water mark”134 and “wetlands created by the en126

Id. at 364.
628 N.W.2d 781, 784 (Wis. 2001).
128
580 S.E.2d 116, 119 (S.C. 2003).
129
Id. at 120.
130
McQueen v. S. C. Coastal Council, 496 S.E.2d 643, 650 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998).
131
McQueen v. S. C. Coastal Council, 530 S.E.2d 628, 634-35 (S.C. 2000).
132
McQueen v. S. C. Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Control, 533 U.S. 943 (2001).
133
533 U.S. 606 (2001) (explaining that in Palazzolo, an owner of coastal wetlands
that was denied fill permits for the construction of a private beach club successfully appealed, in part, a Rhode Island Supreme Court decision that his takings claims were unripe,
that his title never included the right to fill the wetlands because he acquired the property
after the regulations preventing same had been adopted, and that he had not met the tests of
either Lucas or Penn Central); see also id. at 616-17. The United States Supreme Court held
that the claims were ripe, that regulations could not “put an expiration date on the Takings
Clause,” and that the remaining use value in the uplands portion of the property for a singlefamily residence foreclosed a Lucas claim, but the court remanded for consideration under
Penn Central. Id. at 626-27, 630-31.
134
McQueen, 580 S.E.2d at 119.
127
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croachment of navigable tidal water belong to the State.”135 Moreover, the state also has “exclusive right to control land below the high
water mark for the public benefit . . . and cannot permit activity that
substantially impairs the public interest in marine life, water quality,
or public access.”136 The court then held that so much of McQueen’s
lots that had “rever[ted] to tidelands” were “public trust property subject to control of the State.”137
In Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department
of Environment Protection,138 a group of coastal property owners
claimed a taking of their littoral rights after the state, under a shore
protection statute, fixed their seaward boundaries with an erosioncontrol line and sea wall that followed the mean high-water line.139
The state then restored seventy-five feet of beach and pronounced the
new land to be state property, thus depriving the formerly-littoral
owners of that status as well as any future addition to the beach by
accretion.140 The landowners’ rights of access to the ocean, however,
were preserved.141 The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the state supreme court, holding that the statute did not deprive the owners of
property rights because the land reclaimed by the state was in the
public trust area and, at common law, land created by avulsion—even
purposefully by the state—goes to the state.142 Because “[t]wo core
principles of Florida property law intersect[ed] in this case” in favor
of the state, the court held that “[t]he Florida Supreme Court decision
before us is consistent with . . . background principles of state property law[,]” and therefore no taking had occurred.143
135

Id. at 120.
Id. at 119-20.
137
Id. at 120.
138
560 U.S. 702 (2010), aff’g Walton Cnty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 998 So.
2d 1102 (Fla. 2008).
139
Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 711.
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
Id. at 733.
143
Id. at 730-31. Some commentators have viewed the decision primarily in the context of a broader debate about “judicial takings.” See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Littoral
Rights Under the Takings Doctrine: The Clash Between the Ius Naturale and Stop the Beach
Renourishment, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 37 (2011) (contending inter alia that
avulsion does not allow for man-made changes, that littoral common-law property rights are
derived from natural law and thus have constitutional status, and that arguably the Florida
Supreme Court had judicially “taken” those rights); Trevor Burrus, Black Robes and Grabby
Hands: Judicial Takings and the Due Process Clause, 21 WIDENER L.J. 719, 722 (2012)
(stating “Scalia and his three colleagues [in the plurality opinion] found merit in the idea of
136
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Not all courts have been quick to accept extensions of the
public trust doctrine, and even those that accept it within its traditional limits often permit limited private use of public trust resources.
Thus, in Kootenai Environmental Alliance, Inc. v. State Board of
Land Commissioners,144 the court approved the leasing of state lands
impressed with a public trust to a private club for the construction,
maintenance and use of private docking facilities on a bay in a navigable lake, on the grounds that such lease and use was “not incompatible” with the public trust imposed on the property. 145 Moving to applying the public trust doctrine to private land, the court in Bell v
Town of Wells Beach,146 held that attempts to cross private land to
reach public land for recreational purposes in accordance with the
state’s “Public Trust and Intertidal Land Act” resulted in a taking of
private property without compensation.147 Another court refused to
expand statutory declarations of public trust to permit access across
private land to reach inter-tidal lands in Opinion of the Justices:148
The permanent physical intrusion into the property of
private persons, which the bill would establish, is a
taking of property within even the most narrow construction of that phrase possible under the Constitutions of the Commonwealth and of the United States. .
. . The interference with private property here involves a wholesale denial of an owner’s right to exclude the public.149
To the same effect is Opinion of the Justices (Public Use of
Coastal Beaches),150 in which the court held that a new statute
providing for access to tide-flowed public trust shoreline across abutting private land was a taking:
When the government unilaterally authorizes a permanent, public easement across private lands, this constitutes a taking requiring just compensation. . . . Bejudicial takings being protected by the Takings Clause; they just did not believe a judicial
taking had occurred in Stop the Beach.”).
144
671 P.2d 1085 (Idaho 1983).
145
Id. at 1096.
146
557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989).
147
Id. at 169.
148
313 N.E.2d 561 (Mass. 1974).
149
Id. at 568.
150
649 A.2d 604 (N.H. 1994).
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cause the bill provides no compensation for the landowners whose property may be burdened by the general recreational easement established for public use, it
violates the prohibition contained in our State and
Federal Constitutions against the taking of private
property for public use without just compensation.
Although the State has the power to permit a comprehensive beach access and use program by using its
eminent domain power and compensating private
property owners, it may not take property rights without compensation through legislative decree.151
The same court drove home these advisory points when five years
later it considered an actual case and controversy152 in which forty
beachfront property owners sued the state on regulatory taking
grounds when the state moved a public trust lands boundary line inland from the mean high water mark:
Having determined that New Hampshire common law
limits public ownership of the shorelands to the mean
high water mark, we conclude that the legislature went
beyond these common law limits by extending public
trust rights to the highest high water mark. . . . Because [the statute] unilaterally authorizes the taking of
private shoreland for public use and provides no compensation for landowners whose property has been appropriated, it violates the prohibition in Part I, Article
12 of the State Constitution and the Fifth Amendment
of the Federal Constitution against the taking of property for public use without just compensation. . . .
Although it may be desirable for the State to expand
public beaches to cope with increasing crowds, the
State may not do so without compensating affected
landowners.153
More recently, in Severance v. Patterson,154 the Supreme
Court of Texas answered questions certified from the federal court of
151

Id. at 611.
Purdie v. Attorney General, 732 A.2d 442 (N.H. 1999).
153
Id. at 447.
154
370 S.W.3d 705 (Tex. 2012), answering questions certified from Severance v. Patterson, 566 F.3d 490 (5th Cir. 2009).
152
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appeals and reversed a line of state appellate court decisions dating
from 1979155 on so-called “rolling easements,” holding that
when a beachfront vegetation line is suddenly and
dramatically pushed landward by acts of nature, an existing public easement on the public beach does not
“roll” inland to other parts of the parcel or onto a new
parcel of land. . . . In those situations, when changes
occur suddenly and perceptibly to materially alter littoral boundaries, the land encumbered by the easement
is lost to the public trust, along with the easement attached to that land.156
Interpreting the state’s Open Beaches Act (OBA), the court distinguished between “wet” beach (land between the mean low and high
tides) held by the state in public trust and “dry” beach (land between
the mean high tide and the vegetation line) that could be publicly or
privately owned.157 Under the OBA, the “public beach” is composed
of the wet beach and those areas of the dry beach that are either publicly owned or private land over which a public easement has been
established by prescription, dedication, or custom.158 The court stated
that neither violent weather nor the OBA could create public easements on private land; rather, the state had to demonstrate “proof of
the normal means of creating an easement.”159 Interestingly, while
the federal circuit court found Carol Severance’s takings claim unripe
under Williamson County,160 it nonetheless remanded, allowing the
plaintiff to proceed with her claims of illegal seizure under the Fourth
Amendment.161
In Casitas Municipal Water District v. United States,162 the
federal government raised the public trust doctrine, the beneficial use
doctrine, and a section of the California Fish and Game Code as
background principles in defense of a regulatory takings claim
155

Moody v. White, 593 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); Matcha v. Mattox, 711
S.W.2d 95 (Tex. App. 1986); Arrington v. Mattox, 767 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. App. 1989).
156
Severance, 370 S.W.3d at 708, 724 (emphasis added).
157
Id. at 714-15.
158
Id.
159
Id. at 721; see also Brannan v. Texas, 390 S.W.3d 301 (Tex. 2013) (vacating and
remanding in light of Severance).
160
Severance, 566 F.3d at 496-97 (citing Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. 172).
161
Severance v. Patterson, 682 F.3d 360 (5th Cir. 2012).
162
102 Fed. Cl. 443 (2011).

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2014

21

Touro Law Review, Vol. 30, No. 2 [2014], Art. 10

392

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

brought by the Water District after the National Marine Fisheries
Service required installation of a fish ladder and associated diversion
of water.163 Ironically, the Court of Federal Claims held that California’s appropriative water rights system and beneficial use doctrine
defined the plaintiff’s property right so that a taking was conceivable
though unripe.164 The public trust doctrine, said the court, did not
have primacy over the state’s system of appropriative rights; rather,
the state had sought to balance and integrate the two systems.165
“Because the relevant property interest is plaintiff’s right to beneficial use, that right cannot be taken until defendant’s action encroaches on plaintiff’s ability to deliver water to its customers.”166 In the
end, the court held that the proper claim was for a physical, not a regulatory taking and dismissed the case on ripeness grounds. The Federal Circuit affirmed.167
2.

Customary Law as a Background Principle

Customary rights in land usually arise when a particular group
or class of persons can show a right to do a particular thing or practice upon land which they neither own nor otherwise possess the right
to do, based upon past and unchallenged practice extending back over
some time.168 The claimant to the custom would, in other words, be a
trespasser on the land of another, but for the custom.169 The reception
of customary law in the United States was originally chilly despite its
common, though restricted, use in England.170 The reasons had much
to do with the restrictions on use resulting from the application of the
doctrine, and the difficulties in terminating a custom, once found or
declared.171 The latter issue was of particular concern to the legendary John Chipman Gray, of future interests and the rule against perpetuities fame, whose concern was the establishment of yet another collation of perpetual interests in property: “Especially it should be
163

Id. at 451-52.
Id. at 477-78.
165
Id. at 458.
166
Id. at 471.
167
Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 708 F.3d 1340, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
168
Callies & Breemer, supra note 97, at 344-46.
169
Id.
170
David L. Callies, Custom and the Public Trust: Background Principles of State
Property Law?, 30 ENVTL. L. RPTR. 10003, 10004 (2000).
171
See generally id.
164
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remembered that they cannot be released, for no inhabitant, or body
of inhabitants, is entitled to speak for future inhabitants. Such rights
form perpetuities of the most objectionable character.”172
An early nineteenth-century court put it well in Ackerman v.
173
Shelp, in which a custom was alleged to permit inhabitants of a
town an easement to reach a riverbank:
[I]f [this] custom . . . is to prevail according to the
common law notion of it, these lots must lie open forever to the surprise of unsuspecting owners, and to the
curtailing [of] commerce, in its more advanced state,
of the accommodation of docks and wharves, when
perhaps a tenth part of the lots now open would be all
sufficient as watering places; a principle of such extensive operation ought not to be strained beyond the
limits assigned to it in law. If [the] public convenience requires [highways] to church, school, mill,
market or water, they are obtainable in a much more
direct and rational manner under the statute than by
way of immemorial usage and custom.174
Despite this cautionary background concerning the problems
associated with custom, modern courts in the United States have declared public rights or rights of a huge class of strangers to cross private land based exclusively on some version of customary law. Perhaps the most famous of these is State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay,175 in
which the plaintiffs sought to prevent the Hays from constructing improvements on the dry-sand beach portion of their lot between the
high water line and the upland vegetation line.176 Rejecting the proffered bases of prescriptive rights and easements, the court decided in
favor of the plaintiffs, sua sponte, extending customary rights to virtually the entire population of Oregon along its entire coastline:
Because many elements of prescription are present in
172

JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 586 (1886); see David J.
Bederman, The Curious Resurrection of Custom: Beach Access and Judicial Takings, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 1375 (1996) (providing for a fuller treatment of customary law); Paul M.
Sullivan, Customary Revolutions: The Law of Custom and the Conflict of Traditions in Hawai`i, 20 U. HAW. L. REV. 99 (1998); see also Callies, supra note 170.
173
8 N.J.L. 125 (1825).
174
Id. at 130-31.
175
462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969).
176
Id. at 672.
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this case, the state has relied upon the doctrine in support of the decree below. We believe, however, that
there is a better legal basis for affirming the decree.
The most cogent basis for the decision in this case is
the English doctrine of custom. Strictly construed,
prescription applies only to the specific tract of land
before the court, and doubtful prescription cases could
fill the courts for years with tract-by-tract litigation.
An established custom, on the other hand, can be
proven with reference to a larger region. Ocean-front
lands from the northern to the southern [boundary] of
the state ought to be treated uniformly.177
Lest the reach of custom be misunderstood in a per se, total
regulatory takings context under Lucas, the same court, in Stevens v.
City of Cannon Beach,178 responded to a takings claim over the refusal of local government to grant a seawall permit on customary
rights interference grounds, that the customary law of Oregon preventing such construction was a background principle of state property law and therefore an exception to the categorical total takings rule
when a property owner was left with no economically beneficial use
of his land.179
In two landmark cases,180 the Hawai’i Supreme Court expanded previous rulings to provide that native Hawaiians—which
number about 300,000 out of a state population of about 1.2 million—are entitled to exercise their state-constitutionally-protected
traditional and customary rights on land which is “not fully developed,” whether or not such native Hawaiians actually own property
or reside on their land, provided they can show they have traditionally done so.181 The two cases deal specifically with access rights and
gathering rights, but the supreme court indicated it did not mean to
restrict the definition of traditional and customary rights to these two
categories.182 However, in a subsequent decision,183 the supreme
177

Id. at 676.
854 P.2d 449 (Or. 1993).
179
Id. at 456.
180
Pele Def. Fund v. Paty, 837 P.2d 1247 (Haw. 1992); Pub. Access Shoreline Hawaii
v. Hawaii Cnty. Planning Comm’n, 903 P.2d 1246 (Haw. 1995).
181
Pub. Access Shoreline Haw., 903 P.2d at 1271-72.
182
Id. at 1269-70; Pele Defense Fund, 837 P.2d at 1271-72.
183
Hawai’i v. Hanapi, 970 P.2d 485 (Haw. 1998).
178
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court modified its earlier decisions by holding that in order to exercise such traditional and customary rights, a native Hawaiian needed
to prove that such a right existed geographically where claimed, and
that such native Hawaiian was specifically entitled to exercise that
right.184 In other words, such traditional and customary rights as are
protected by the Hawai’i state constitution do not extend to every native Hawaiian and to every parcel of land in the state. The last decision further specifically held that such rights can only be exercised on
undeveloped or less than fully developed land, specifically holding
that on land which is residentially-zoned with existing dwellings, improvements and infrastructure, it is “always inconsistent” to permit
the practice of such rights.185 The subject parcel in the case consisted
of several acres with but one dwelling.186
More recently, the Hawai’i Supreme Court in State v. Pratt187
revisited native Hawaiian customary and traditional rights as a defense to criminal trespass, clarifying the judicial analysis last addressed more than a decade earlier.188 Pratt, a native Hawaiian healer, had been camping in an area of a state park closed to protect
natural resources and a fragile ecosystem.189 Claiming the valley in
question to be family property, Pratt had been conducting rituals to
heal the land, removing invasive species of flora, and acting as a
caretaker for indigenous archaeological sites.190 He had also cleared
land for subsistence agriculture and essentially taken up long-term
residence.191 Affirming the intermediate appellate court, the supreme
court upheld Pratt’s conviction, decreeing that once a defendant has
met the burden for establishing traditional and customary Hawaiian
rights under the state constitution and case law—as Pratt did here—a
court must apply a “totality of the circumstances” test to weigh the
defendant’s customary rights against the state’s right to regulate
them:
While Pratt has a strong interest in visiting Kalalau
Valley, he did not attempt to visit in accordance with
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191

Id. at 493-94.
Id. at 494.
Id. at 486.
277 P.3d 300 (Haw. 2012).
Id. at 301.
Id. at 302-04, 312.
Id. at 302-03.
Id. at 303.
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the laws of the State. Those laws serve important purposes, including maintaining the park for public use
and preserving the environment of the park. The outcome of this case should not be seen as preventing
Pratt from going to the Kalalau Valley; Pratt may go
and stay overnight whenever he obtains the proper
permit. . . . The trial court did not err in determining
that Pratt’s interest in conducting his activities without
a permit did not outweigh the State’s interest in limiting the number of visitors to Kalalau Valley; Pratt’s
activities, therefore, do not fall under constitutional
protection.192
Less than three weeks later, however, the court granted Pratt’s motion
for reconsideration, and the opinion remains in limbo.193
Shortly after the state supreme court agreed to reconsider the
Pratt decision, a Hawai’i appellate court considered claims by a native Hawaiian citizen that the State Historic Preservation Division
had improperly failed to require an archaeological inventory survey
for additions and renovations to an historic church which had resulted
in the disturbance of sixty-nine unrecorded burials, some of Native
Hawaiians.194 The plaintiff alleged violations of the public trust doctrine and constitutional and statutory provisions protecting the exercise of Native Hawaiian customary and traditional rights. 195 Noting
that the plaintiff had cited no authority for the former claim and that
the latter provisions did not “establish[] a basis for relief” distinct
from other law designed to protect historic burials, the court affirmed
dismissal of those two counts.196 The court also suggested that Native Hawaiian rights would not apply in this case because the church
property was fully developed.197 The state supreme court, however,
has granted certiorari.198
The two jurisdictions—Oregon and Hawai’i—share a further
commonality: both have cited Blackstone and his Commentaries on
192

Pratt, 277 P.3d at 312.
Id. at 327.
194
Hall v. Dep’t of Land & Nat. Res., 290 P.3d 525, 530 (Haw. Ct. App. 2012).
195
Id. at 531.
196
Id. at 543.
197
Id. (citing Hanapi, 970 P.2d at 485, 494-95).
198
Hall v. Dep’t of Land & Nat. Res., No. SCWC-12-0000061, 2013 WL 3064928
(Haw. June 17, 2013).
193
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the Laws of England (“Commentaries”)199 as the basis for their decisions. Blackstone wrote his Commentaries—summaries of lectures
given at Oxford—just prior to the American Revolution. The Commentaries were generally regarded as an accurate summary of the
common law of England, most of which was practiced in the colonies
while subject to the Crown and “received” in the new United States
via so-called reception statutes in the new individual states.200 Blackstone’s view of customary law was cautious. He correctly perceived
the tension between customary rights and the common law rights associated with the holding of land.201 He therefore suggested that for a
custom to be good, it must satisfy seven criteria. “[A] custom had to
be immemorial, continuous, peaceable, reasonable, certain, compulsory and consistent.”202 According to the Commentaries (and English
case law during, before, and since), to be “certain” and “reasonable”
meant that the custom was to be exercised only within a relatively
small geographic area—a village, a town, perhaps a small county—
and by a distinct and relatively small group of people—residents of
such villages and towns, for example.203 It also had to have been
practiced—or at least the right to practice must have existed—
continuously, without interruption, and for a long time.204 It is not altogether clear that either the customs declared in Hawai’i or in Oregon come close to meeting these criteria.205 Nevertheless, they are, as
presently defined by the courts of these two states, almost certainly
“background principles of a state’s law of property” and, once proven, defenses to claims of regulatory taking based on their exercise.206
Beaches, custom, and the public trust doctrine intersected in
Florida in Trepanier v. County of Volusia,207 an inverse condemnation action where a state appellate court clarified the standard for es199

WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (William Carey
Jones ed., Bancroft-Whitney Co. 1915).
200
Callies, supra note 170, at 10006.
201
Bederman, supra note 172, at 1427, 1441.
202
Callies, supra note 170, at 10006.
203
BLACKSTONE, supra note 199, at 75.
204
Gregory M. Duhl, Property and Custom: Allocating Space in Public Places, 79
TEMP. L. REV. 199, 206-08 (2006).
205
See id. at 225 (stating in pertinent part: “Even in states in which courts have recognized customary rights, such as Oregon and Hawai`i, the courts have not held fast to the seven elements of Blackstonian custom. Courts have relaxed the elements of reasonableness
and certainty to give the public broad access to private land . . . .”).
206
E.g., Callies & Breemer, supra note 97, at 364.
207
965 So. 2d 276 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
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tablishing a customary right and rejected any Oregon-style creation
of state-wide rights as in State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay.208 The plaintiffs owned littoral parcels which, under Florida’s public trust doctrine, included fee title to the mean high tide line in an area of New
Smyrna Beach where the public, as regulated by the county, regularly
drove and parked on the beach.209 Between the roadway and the sand
dunes, the County maintained a thirty-foot habitat conservation zone
(HCZ) for the protection of endangered sea turtles.210 Before 1999,
the roadway and the marked HCZ were in the public trust area outside plaintiffs’ platted lots, but a series of avulsive events (i.e., hurricanes and other storms) moved the mean high water line to within a
few feet of plaintiffs’ sea walls.211 The county gradually moved the
roadway and HCZ inland along with it to occupy plaintiffs’ dry sand
beach.212 The trial court initially granted summary judgment to the
county, holding that the public had a “superior claim to possession
and use” of the dry sand beach by virtue of custom, prescription, and
dedication and proclaimed that such applied to all beaches in the
county.213
The appellate court, however, reversed and remanded.214 After distinguishing custom from the public trust doctrine—the public
trust area migrates with the changing shoreline but the same is not
necessarily true of privately-owned areas subject to customary
right215—the court held that the county not only needed to prove the
elements of custom for the specific area subject to the alleged customary right but also that the right customarily migrated with the
high tide line.216 While the court found clear proof that there had
never been any intent to dedicate the land, it concluded that genuine
issues of material fact existed with respect to the county’s counterclaims of prescription and custom, with the court characterizing the
latter as the county’s best argument.217 According to the court,
[i]n addition to the temporal requirement of “ancient”
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217

462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969).
Trepanier, 965 So. 2d at 278, 280.
Id. at 278-79.
Id. at 278.
Id. at 279.
Id. at 280.
Trepanier, 965 So. 2d at 278.
Id. at 290.
Id. at 293.
Id.
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use, three other key elements must be proven: peaceableness, certainty and consistency. Finally, the customary use must be shown to be “reasonable.” While
some may find it preferable that proof of these elements of custom be established for the entire state by
judicial fiat in order to protect the right of public access to Florida’s beaches, it appears to us that the acquisition of a right to use private property by custom is
intensely local and anything but theoretical.218
Sidestepping the awkward notion that any use of an automobile could
be considered “ancient,” the court remanded for presentation of specific evidence.219 After redefining “ancient” to be “historic” and asserting that one hundred years of substantially uninterrupted use qualified as such, the trial court ultimately held the custom proved and
that the customary right had migrated inland after avulsive events.220
Although concluding that the plaintiff had not proved the elements of
inverse condemnation, the court made it clear that any takings claim
would have been defeated by the customary right.221
3.

Statutes as Background Principles

More troubling is the occasional case finding background
principles in preexisting statutes, which would broaden the exception
considerably and likely contrary to the implications of Lucas which,
after all, did involve the application of a statute. Thus, for example,
the Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that a “positive law”
could be construed as a background principle if it were passed prior
to the landowner’s acquisition of the subject parcel.222 Finally, in a
strange twist on the law of background principles exceptions, a court
of appeals in Arizona denied a takings claim by a landowner over
whose property flowed (by state permit) water for another landowner
whose use of property (underground water storage) depended upon
flowing water via his private stream.223 The court held that the doc218

Id. at 289.
Trepanier, 965 So. 2d at 282, 293.
220
Id. at 282.
221
Id. at 283, 293.
222
Sanderson v. Town of Candia, 787 A.2d 167, 169 (N.H. 2001).
223
W. Maricopa Combine, Inc. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Water Res., 26 P.3d 1171, 1173
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).
219
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trine of prior appropriation, upon which the permit was based, was a
background principle of Arizona’s water law, rendering such a takings claim impossible under a Lucas exception.224
IV.

CONCLUSION

The factual context for a Lucas categorical total taking of all
economically beneficial use will, as the Court acknowledged, happen
rarely.225 Vastly more common will be circumstances in which a
landowner may allege and prove frustration of investment-backed
expectations—reasonable or distinct, the Court has used both adjectives—resulting in a partial taking under Penn Central,226 always
provided the barrier raised by overzealous application of its “prudential” ripeness doctrine can be surmounted.227 However, rare as a total
or categorical taking by regulation may be, the effects of such a taking can be breathtaking. Thus, for example, in Hawai’i, where nearly
half the state has been placed in a state conservation district by the
state’s appointed Land Use Commission (LUC), virtually no economically beneficial use is permitted in 3 of the 4 subzones into which
224

Id. at 1180.
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015-18.
226
Id. at 1019-20; see also Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 330-31 (stating “[a]nything less
than a ‘complete elimination of value,’ or a ‘total loss,’ the [Lucas] Court acknowledged,
would require the kind of analysis applied in Penn Central. . . . The starting point for the
[district] court’s analysis should have been to ask whether there was a total taking of the entire parcel; if not, then Penn Central was the proper framework.”).
227
See Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head, 724 F.3d 533, 536 (4th Cir. 2013) (reversing
the district court summary judgment that Town’s removal of action to Federal Court rendered plaintiffs’ takings claim unripe for failure to seek compensation from the state first);
but see a more rational perspective on ripeness: Town of Nags Head v. Toloczko, 728 F.3d
391, 399 (4th Cir. 2013) (reversing the district court’s decision to decline jurisdiction in takings claim when plaintiffs removed case to federal court);
Where a plaintiff’s failure to satisfy Williamson County[‘s ripeness requirements] results from their own litigation strategy, rather than the defendant’s ‘procedural gamesmanship’ or forum manipulation, Sansotta’s
waiver principle does not apply. But ‘[b]ecause Williamson County is a
prudential rather than a jurisdictional rule, we may determine that in
some instances, the rule should not apply and we still have the power to
decide the case.’ Exercise of such discretion may be particularly appropriate to avoid ‘piecemeal litigation or otherwise unfair procedures.’
This is a proper case to exercise our discretion to suspend the statelitigation requirement of Williamson County. In the interests of fairness
and judicial economy, we will not impose further rounds of litigation on
the Toloczkos [internal citations omitted].
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Sansotta, 724 F.3d at 543).
225

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol30/iss2/10

30

Callies and Robyak: The Categorical (Lucas) Rule

2014]

THE CATEGORICAL (LUCAS) RULE

401

that classification is divided.228 Moreover, since the state Department
of Land and Natural Resources is bound by its regulatory authority to
petition the LUC for Conservation District reclassification with respect to any land for which critical habitat for endangered species is
designated, coupled with the fact that Hawai’i has more such species
than any other state,229 one can easily visualize thousands upon thousands of acres of private land placed in a classification where no economically beneficial use is permitted.230
This state of affairs renders the definitions of nuisance, public
trust, and custom—the only exceptions which allow government to
take by regulation all economically beneficial use from private land
without paying compensation as if the land were condemned—of
critical importance. Clearly the concept of fee simple—which, as the
Court notes, has a long and distinguished history and place in American jurisprudence231—does not include rights of use which were “not
part of the landowner’s title to begin with.” But the Court inveighed
at length against courts making up such exceptions, particularly in the
customary law and public trust areas, as they go along.232 It is difficult to characterize such decisions as those of the Oregon Supreme
228
ST. OF HAW. LAND USE COMM’N, http://luc.hawaii.gov/about/state-land-usedistricts/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2014).
229
Hawaii, Meet Your 15 New Endangered Species, BigIslandNews.com,
http://www.bigislandvideonews.com/2013/10/28/hawaii-meet-your-newly-designated-endan
gered-species/ (Oct. 28, 2013) (stating in pertinent part that Hawaii has 526 species on the
Endangered Species Act list, with California a distant second at 315 listings. The species
added included a picture-wing fly, the anchialine pool shrimp, and 13 plant species, most of
which have no common names).
230
Anthony Sommer, U.S. cuts critical habitat for 2 tiny Kauai critters, HONOLULU
STAR-BULLETIN, Apr. 10, 2003, available at http://archives.starbulletin.com/2003/04/10/new
s/index16.html (stating that at one point a few years ago, fully a quarter of the island of Kauai was temporarily so designated, including all of the thousands-of-acres private Grove
Farm, presently the site of a planned master-planned community of mixed commercial and
residential uses. The “critters” were a cave spider and a cave amphipod, both blind).
231
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016.
232

[T]he legislature’s recitation of a noxious-use justification cannot be the
basis for departing from our categorical rule . . . . If it were, departure
would virtually always be allowed. . . . [The government] must do more
than proffer the legislature’s declaration that the uses [the property owner] desires are inconsistent with the public interest, or the conclusory assertion that they violate a common-law maxim. . . . Instead . . . [the government] must identify background principles of nuisance and property
law that prohibit the uses [the property owner] now intends in the circumstances in which the property is presently found.
Id. at 1026, 1031.
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Court in the customary law arena and the New Jersey courts in the
public trust arena as anything but just such judicial behavior. Just as
John Chipman Gray warned about creating a new class of perpetuities,233 Blackstone, whose treatise on the common law was so immensely influential among lawyers and judges in Eighteenth-Century
America, worried publicly about the potential for customary law to
swallow up common law rights in property.234 Hence his seven limitations on the finding of a custom in derogation of such common law
rights, most of which were twisted and violated by the Oregon courts
in their seminal customary law decisions even though they purported
to follow such Blackstonian custom.235 In sum, the protections afforded private property from wholesale regulatory confiscation by
government are fragile enough without their evisceration by courts
and legislatures seeking to protect their version of public rights by
short cuts without paying compensation.236 As the late Chief Justice
Rehnquist observed in Dolan v. City of Tigard237, the takings clause
of the United States Constitution deserves the same treatment and respect as civil rights guaranteeing free speech or protecting against unreasonable search and seizure.238 In an America where the judiciary
protects penumbras and emanations derived from written language in
our Bill of Rights, rights which are clearly spelled out in the Constitution’s Fifth Amendment demand no less.

233

Bederman, supra note 172, at 1407.
Duhl, supra note 204, at 208.
235
Thornton, 462 P.2d 671; Stevens, 854 P.2d 449.
236
Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922) (stating “[w]e are in danger of
forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the
change.”).
237
512 U.S. 374 (1994).
238
Id. at 392 (stating that “[w]e see no reason why the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, as much a part of the Bill of Rights as the First Amendment or Fourth Amendment, should be relegated to the status of a poor relation in these comparable circumstances.”).
234

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol30/iss2/10

32

